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Tailored Reversible Watermarking Schemes for
Authentication of Electronic Clinical Atlas
Feng Bao, Robert H. Deng, Senior Member, IEEE, Beng Chin Ooi, Member, IEEE, and Yanjiang Yang
Abstract—It is accepted that digital watermarking is quite rele-
vant in medical imaging. However, due to the special nature of clin-
ical practice, it is often required that watermarking not introduce
irreversible distortions to medical images. The electronic clinical
atlas has such a need of “lossless” watermarking. We present two
tailored reversible watermarking schemes for the clinical atlas by
exploiting its inherent characteristics. We have implemented the
schemes and our experimental results look very promising.
Index Terms—Authentication, electronic clinical atlas, reversible
watermarking, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
E FFICIENT maintenance of medical data in an electronicformat is crucial for enhancing the quality and efficacy
of healthcare through efficient information sharing. However,
along with the benefits is the growing concern about the secu-
rity of digital medical information. In a broad sense, security
issues pertaining to digital medical data are categorized into the
following aspects [1], [2]:
1) Confidentiality: individual privacy of patients as well as
physicians implies that medical data must be protected
from inappropriate disclosure. Only authorized users with
appropriate rights are offered access to the data.
2) Authentication: authentication (reliability in [1] and [2])
of medical data can be further classified into a) integrity:
medical information must be assured of its intactness; b)
authenticity: credibility must be given to the users that the
underlying data are what they are claimed to be.
3) Availability: medical data must be guaranteed to be readily
available to the authorized users.
Medical imaging constitutes an important part of digital med-
ical data. Clearly, the attacks that threaten digital medical infor-
mation as a whole (see e.g., [3] and [4]) would also apply to
medical images. In this paper, we explor the authentication as-
pect of medical images.
Multimedia authentication inherits many characteristics of
generic data authentication using cryptographic primitives, such
as integrity verification, authenticity verification, and nonrepu-
diation [5]. However, multimedia authentication has its own
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unique features that make the techniques for generic data au-
thentication insufficent and sometimes undesirable. For exam-
ple, an image changing from one format to another without
losing visual content should be deemed authentic in multime-
dia authentication, whereas this turns out to be hard to achieve
by applying generic data authentication that uses message au-
thentication code (MAC) or digital signature [5]. As a result,
multimedia authentication is normally accomplished by digital
watermarking [6], [7]. Digital watermarking can be classified
into copyright watermarking and authentication watermarking,
based on the purposes it is intended for. We note watermark-
ing can also be used to establish a channel for carrying, e.g.,
meta-data [8]–[10]. In a strict sense, this application of water-
marking belongs to the area of steganography, since the objec-
tive is to hide medical data in a host image for data secrecy
purposes. In copyright watermarking, the inserted mark, upon
extraction, asserts ownership of the underlying data. To achieve
this end, copyright watermarking must be robust so that the
inserted mark cannot be easily removed. In contrast, authen-
tication watermarking is designed to prove the integrity and
authenticity of the underlying data. Authentication watermark-
ing can be further classified into hard authentication and soft
authentication [11]. Hard authentication detects and rejects any
modification to the multimedia content except for lossless com-
pression and format conversion with equivalent visual content,
while soft authentication allows for admissible content modi-
fications while rejects malicious manipulations. The lack of a
clear distinction between admissible and malicious operations
is one of the main challenges for soft authentication.
Clearly, authentication watermarking represents a viable solu-
tion to authentication of medical images in our context. We note
that medical practice is very strict with the management of med-
ical data for clinical, ethical, and legislative reasons [1], [12].
Thus, in many cases it, is often desirable that watermarking
itself does not introduce any distortion to the medical images
for the purpose of data authentication. For example, images
used for court proof or for data archiving are strictly forbid-
den to be altered. However, it is well known that, normally,
watermarking, including hard authentication watermarking, in-
troduces perpetual distortions to the original data. This suggests
that most of the existing authentication watermarking techniques
are not satisfactory for medical imaging. To authenticate medical
images, a watermarking scheme must possess reversibility—
the ability to recover the exact original content from a wa-
termarked image. Watermarking working in such a reversible
way is referred to as reversible (lossless, invertible, distortion-
free, erasible, etc.) watermarking [13]–[18] in the literature. Re-
versible watermarking is regarded as a special form of hard
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authentication [11]. In this paper, we develop reversible
watermarking schemes that are tailored for authentication of the
electronic clinical atlas [19]–[21], a particular type of medical
images in palette format. Our motivations for studying reversible
watermarking for electronic clinical atlas are:
1) This is in conformance with strict medical practice in
general;
2) The atlas, in combination with other medical imaging
modalities, has a wide spectrum of applications in func-
tional neurosurgery, brain mapping, neuroeducation, and
so on (see e.g., [20]–[22]). Usability of these applications,
many of which run in an online interactive mode, is deter-
mined largely by the accuracy of the underlying atlas and
the brain data. This highlights the need for the authentica-
tion of the atlas by reversible watermarking;
3) As we shall discuss shortly, the atlas has some unique
features, which make the existing reversible watermarking
schemes inadequate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide a brief background on multimedia au-
thentication, and review related work on reversible watermark-
ing and authentication of medical images. In Section III, we
propose two tailored reversible watermarking schemes for au-
thentication of the electronic clinical atlas, by exploiting the
very nature of the atlas. We present experimental results in
Sections IV, and V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background
Authentication of generic data has been well studied in
cryptography [5], where either a MAC or a digital signature
is computed on and appended to a message [5]. The MAC
or the signature is treated as accessory data, semantically dis-
tinguishable from the message itself. Though the generic ap-
proach does not in any way affect the fidelity of the data to
be authenticated, it has some intrinsic limitations when ap-
plied for authentication of multimedia content: 1) a malicious
intruder can easily separate and ruin the ancillary authentica-
tion payload, thereby disabling the authentication functionality;
2) the tagged payload is susceptible to normal file format conver-
sion, so much so that even a simple resave operation will render
it useless; and 3) the generic data authentication technique lacks
the property of localization; i.e., the ability to determine the
locations where modifications were made.
These limitations can be overcome using authentication wa-
termarking which embeds a watermark payload into multime-
dia data, so that the payload is semantically combined with the
data. The ability to localize tampering or determine the sever-
ity of tampering is another highly desirable feature of authen-
tication watermarking [11], [13], [23]. Moreover, depending
on the integrity criteria, authentication watermarking authen-
ticates multimedia content in such a flexible way that hard
authentication rejects every alteration, while soft authentica-
tion passes admissible operations. A stronger requirement in
some scenarios; e.g., in military or healthcare, is the recovery
of the exact original content from the watermarked data. Reg-
Fig. 1. Flow chart for reversible watermarking.
ular watermarking does not possess such an ability. This calls
for a special type of authentication watermarking—reversible
watermarking—which allows for the recovery of the original
data from the watermarked data. The fundamental principle of
reversible watermarking is demonstrated in Fig. 1. Note that
the “recovery” process is where reversible watermarking dif-
fers from regular authentication watermarking. By “recovery,”
reversible watermarking can completely remove the introduced
distortion and reconstruct the exact content of the original data,
provided that the watermarked image is authentic.
B. Reversible Watermarking
Reversibility of digital watermarking has been explored for
quite some time [24], [25], and progress within recent years
proved its viability for authentication multimedia. The first
known reversible watermarking scheme was due to [14], and the
method in [13] that followed employed the same idea of modulo
addition to extend the classic patchwork algorithm. However,
the embedding capacity of these methods is limited, and an-
noying artifacts may be caused in the underlying images. For
these reasons, they are not very satisfactory for practical use. To
overcome these limitations, Fridrich et al. [15]–[17] developed
an elegant method for achieving reversible watermarking which
works as follows: a bit plane that can be randomized without
causing noticeable artifacts is losslessly compressed, so that the
original bit stream B is shortened to B′ and the newly created
space of |B| − |B′| bits is used to accommodate the authentica-
tion payload h. Then, the original bit plane is replaced by B′‖h
for the purpose of watermarking, where ‖ denotes concatena-
tion. During the authentication verification, B′ is decompressed
to obtain B, which is, in turn, used to recover the original bit
plane for the reconstruction of the original image. Practical
schemes for virtually any commonly used file format including
raw, uncompressed formats (BMP), lossy or transform formats
(JPEG), and palette formats (GIF, PNG) were presented in [17].
As we will see later, however, the methods for palette format
used by Fridrich et al. cannot be used to reversibly watermark
the electronic clinical atlas due to the unique features of the at-
las. The method of Fridrich et al. is a general approach, whereas
it is not always optimal in certain aspects such as embedding
capacity and image quality preservation.
Reversible watermarking proposed in [18], [26], and [27]
often provides higher embedding capacity. In particular, the
method in [18] creates extra space for the authentication pay-
load by virtue of difference expansion, in conjunction with gen-
eralized least significant bit embedding. In contrast, the scheme
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in [26] adopts a totally different method to achieve reversibility;
that is, circular interpretation of bijective transformations.
Compression on the original data is avoided in [18], and [26].
An added feature of [26] is that the watermarked content can
endure certain lossy processing, and virtually none of the other
methods has this property.
Localization is quite useful in some circumstances. The
method in [28] is the only known reversible watermarking
scheme that provides localization.
C. Authentication of Medical Images
The demand for authentication of medical images is enor-
mous, due to the increasing needs of data exchange within med-
ical community and with external parties such the as research
institutes. The work in [29] highlighted the perspective of apply-
ing generic data authentication techniques such as the one-way
hash function and digital signature for the authentication of
medical images, while [12] demonstrated the applicability of
digital signature in medical imaging.
The relevance of authentication watermarking in medical
imaging for reversible watermarking and integrity control has
been extensively discussed [1]. The work of [30] was based on
the fact that a medical image is normally allowed to be sepa-
rated into regions of interest (ROIs) and regions of noninterest
(RONIs); the ROIs must be strictly preserved while the RONIs
can be allowed for some modifications; consequently, the au-
thentication payload of ROIs is inserted into the RONIs. A pos-
sible weakness of this method is that if an adversary can identify
the RONIS, then the embedded authentication payload can be
totally erased, thereby disabling the authentication functionality.
The work in [31] made improvements over [30] by repeatedly
inserting the payload closely around the ROIs. Moreover, the
payload can be used to repair the ROIs in the case of minor
alterations to the ROIs. A watermarking scheme for DICOM
format images was proposed in [32] to guarantee the genuine
link between a delivered image with the root part of its header.
Specifically, the authentication payload on the information of
the referring physician is inserted in the image content by a
watermarking scheme.
III. TAILORED REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING SCHEMES FOR
ELECTRONIC CLINICAL ATLAS
We first give a brief introduction to the electronic clinical
atlas, discussing its uniqueness and explaining why the existing
reversible watermarking schemes are not effective in water-
marking the atlases. We then propose two tailored schemes to
solve the problem.
A. An Introduction to Electronic Clinical Atlas
The electronic clinical atlas in palette format [19]–[21] is a
special type of medical image: each structure contained in an
atlas is filled completely with a single color. Fig. 8(left) shows
a typical atlas with dimension of 705× 820.
The image file of an atlas semantically includes two parts:
one is the palette (file header) that lists color indices and their
corresponding RGB components, e.g., Fig. 2(a); the other part
Fig. 2. Semantic content of an atlas file. (a) Palette. (b) Image data. (c) Pixel
values.
is the image data (file body) that represent each pixel by a
color index, e.g., Fig. 2(b). In Fig. 2, the atlas containing a
palette as shown in 2(a) and the image data as in 2(b) actually
represents pixel values as shown in 2(c). It is clear that some
regular embedding operations such as LSB modification of the
image data is not appropriate for watermarking the electronic
clinical atlas, because the image data of an atlas are color indices
rather than RGB values, so indices of similar values may refer
to quite different colors.
We next summarize in the following the uniqueness of the
electronic clinical atlas.
1) U1. Most of the atlases are not “natural” images as op-
posed to the “natural” images that are commonly seen in
daily life. A “natural” image normally presents smooth
scene. In contrast, every structure in an atlas is of pure
color (e.g., structures in the atlas in Fig. 8(left) are ho-
mochromous), so that 1) the boundary along two adjoining
structures is clear-cut; 2) any alteration within a structure
by a different color would appear definitely noticeable.
2) U2. An atlas normally does not use up 256 colors, which
is the upper bound that most palette images assume. On
average, 30–100 colors are used to label the structures in
an atlas.
3) U3. While the content of an atlas should be strictly
protected, the palette can be permuted provided that the
content (pixels) of the atlas is not affected. For example,
the following scenario should be allowed: in Fig. 2(a),
the entries of (0, 255, 0) and (0, 0, 255) are permuted
in the palette, and 1’s in the image data [Fig. 2(b)] are
changed to 2’s and 2’s are changed to 1’s. This does not
change the actual pixels.
In principle, we can exploit the existing reversible water-
marking schemes that were designed for palette images to fulfil
the task of reversibly watermarking the electronic clinical atlas.
Unfortunately, the only known schemes that were proposed by
Fridrich et al. in [17] actually turn out to be unable to meet the
needs due to the very nature of the atlases, as listed previously.
To see this, we check the two cases distinguished in [17] with
the electronic clinical atlas as follows.
Case 1) Palette with fewer than 256 distinct colors: The basic
idea is to make at least two entries in the palette for
color c, a most frequently occurring color in the
image to be watermarked. If c already has two or
more entries, nothing needs to be done. Otherwise,
simply allocate an empty entry for c in the palette.
This is feasible as the palette is not used up. We then
BAO et al.: TAILORED REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING SCHEMES FOR AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC CLINICAL ATLAS 557
suppose the indices of two entries of c in the palette
are i and j, respectively. Then 0 is associated with i
and 1 is associated with j. In embedding, the image
is scanned in a defined pattern, e.g., row by row.
When a pixel with color c is encountered, its color
index is changed to i if a bit 0 is to be embedded,
and changed to j otherwise. In extraction, the image
is scanned in the same pattern, and the embedded
binary stream is obtained depending on the indices ,
of color c. Embedding in this way does not alter the
pixels at all, so no further reconstruction is needed.
Due to U2, theoretically, it seems this scheme can be
used for the electronic atlas. However, in practice it
is not the case because this method requires adding
an entry for a most frequent color c. This is not al-
lowed, since further processing of the atlases; e.g.,
automatic extraction of the structure boundaries in
an atlas [22], would be interfered: in this process-
ing, structures represented by different color indices
would be recognized as different. While the palette
of an atlas can tolerate some manipulations as sug-
gested in U3, we should avoid causing interference
to other uses of the atlas, and we are interested in the
watermarking schemes that are compatible with the
existing processing algorithms.
Case 2) Full palette with 256 distinct colors: In case the
palette is exhausted by 256 distinct colors, two col-
ors ci (index is i) and cj (index is j) are chosen, such
that |ci − cj | is small. Then 0 is associated with i and
1 is associated with j. In embedding, the image is
scanned in a defined manner. If a pixel with ci or cj is
encountered, its color index is changed to i if 0 is to
be embedded, and changed to j otherwise. In extrac-
tion, the image is scanned in the same pattern and
the embedded binary stream is obtained depending
on the indices i, j of color ci and cj . It is easy to see
that this scheme is also applicable to the first case,
provided that an appropriate pair of similar colors is
found.
Clearly, this method is a good tool for watermarking
“natural” palette images. However, as suggested in
U1 electronic clinical atlas cannot be assumed “nat-
ural,” so a color pair with minor difference does not
always exist. Furthermore, even such a desired color
pair is found, color flipping within a homochromous
structure would be readily detectable.
We have shown the reasons why the reversible wa-
termarking schemes for palette images in [17] can-
not be used for watermarking electronic clinical at-
las. In Subsections III-B and III-C, we shall pro-
pose two reversible watermarking schemes that are
tailored for electronic clinical atlas, and the pro-
posed schemes circumvent all these limitations. The
first scheme is designed exclusively for the atlases
that comprise homochromous structures, and the
second scheme can be applied to any atlas, be it
“natural” or not.
Fig. 3. Illustration of embedding.
B. Our First Reversible WatermarkingScheme
Intuitively, the main reason the method of Fridrich et al. in
case 2 fails in our scenario lies in the fact that the structures
contained in an atlas are homochromous. We thus tailor our
first scheme exclusively for the atlases with homochromous
structures, and this scheme is an extended version of [33].
For the purpose of watermarking, we are faced with finding
the right embedding channel and the way to insert the authen-
tication payload in an atlas, while without causing perceptible
artifacts. We observe that when a boundary point of a homochro-
mous structure revises its color to its neighboring color, the ef-
fect caused is visually unnoticeable. On the contrary, if a point
within a homochromous structure changes its color to even a
similar color, the difference would be quite clear. Motivated
by this, we shall exploit the boundary points of the homochro-
mous structures for embedding. Meanwhile, to avoid generating
accumulative artifacts, the points to be revised for watermark-
ing should be uniformly diffused over the whole set of bound-
ary points across an atlas. Moreover, we shall follow Fridrich
et al.’s general methodology for achieving reversibility (see Sec-
tion II). We next elaborate our ideas on these issues, and they
are building blocks of the actual scheme.
1) Basic Ideas: For ease of understanding, we take Fig. 3 as
an example, which represents virtually all possible cases of how
structures bordering one another along a row. In particular, along
row i, structureA stands alone without neighbors; two structures
B1 and B2 border each other; more than two structures in turn
border each other (three structures C1, C2, and C3 are used in
the figure, and generalization to the scenario of more than three
structures is straightforward).
a) Embedding Channel: Along a row (row i in Fig. 3),
we in turn pick up p1 in A, p2 in B1, p3 in C1 and p4 in C3 as
channelling points for embedding, and the corresponding struc-
tures A,B1, C1, and C3 as embedding structures. Note that
every other structures in each group of neighboring structures
are chosen as embedding structures. In our example, A,B1, C1
and C3 are chosen as embedding structures, while B2, C2 are
not embedding structures. As we shall see shortly, this is crucial
in preventing interference in encoding between two neighbor-
ing structures if otherwise, every structure is chosen as an em-
bedding structure. The embedding channel for embedding then
comprises the channelling points collected by scanning all rows
across an entire atlas.





b) Encoding Primitive: For an embedding structure, we
associate 0 to the even number of points the structure has along
a row, and 1 to the odd number of points. For example, along
row i in Fig. 3, structure A has six points, B1 has four points,
C1 has five points, and C3 has four points, so the path p1 →
p2 → p3 → p4 is encoded as 0010.
c) Embedding Method: The insertion of a bit-stream into
the embedding channel is equivalent to encoding it along the
channel. Rules on how to embed a bit at a channelling point p
are specified in Table I.
In Table I, let the channelling point be p and the embedding
structure that p lies in be Struct, “Number of points” denotes the
number of points Struct has along the row that traverses p. By
“No action,” we do nothing to p; by “Change color,” we revise
the color of p to its left neighboring color. We include the case
that the left neighboring color is the background color as long
as Struct has no neighboring structure along the row.
To make it clearer, let us see an example of inserting a bit-
stream by executing the preceding rule. Suppose 1001 is to be
embedded along the path determined by p1 → p2 → p3 → p4
in Fig. 3, the embedding is shown in Table II.
According to Table II, p1 is changed to be the background
color; p2 keeps unchanged; p3 is changed to be the background
color; p4 revises its color to be the color of C2.
The reason for choosing every other structures in a group
of neighboring structures is now clear: otherwise, adjoining
structures might mutually spoil each others’ embedding.
d) Recovering Method: We are faced with recovering the
original channelling points by given the original coded stream.
The original coded stream can be obtained because we assume
Fridrich et al. methodology for reversibility in our scheme. It
must be noted that the set of channelling points gathered from an
watermarked atlas might be different from the original one due
to watermarking. This can be easily seen from the above exam-
ple of embedding 1001 along row i. In particular, the channelling
points of A,C1, C3 will change to be the respective right neigh-
boring point of p1, p3, p4, and we denote them as p′1, p′3, p′4,
respectively. This is, however, in no way preventing us from
reconstructing the original structures. Let us continue with the
above example: for structureA, we know the current channelling
Fig. 4. Flowchart for embedding algorithm.
point p′1 is actually the right neighboring point of the original
point p1. From the watermarked atlas, we know the current code
of p′1 along row i is 1. Once we are given the original code 0,
since 0 = 1, we change the color of the left neighboring point
of p′1 to be the color of p′1 in order to recover the structure
A. Likewise, other embedding structures are recovered to their
original content following the same rationale. Note that if the
current code = the original code, the current channelling point
is the original one, e.g.; p2 in our example.
With these ideas, we are ready to give our reversible water-
marking scheme.
2) The Scheme: Similar to a common authentication water-
marking scheme, ours consists of two parts: embedding algo-
rithm and authentication algorithm.
The basic steps of the embedding algorithm are demonstrated
in Fig. 4.
In particular, the embedding algorithm works as follows:
a) Embedding Algorithm:
i) Scan the atlas M row by row in a fixed pattern,
e.g., from top to bottom. Along each row, pick up
the channelling points pi by the method described
in embedding channel. An ordered set is eventually
formed by these points S = {p1, p2, . . . pN }, where
N is the total number of the channelling points that
are picked up.
ii) Reorder S with a secret key k1 by the following pro-
gram:
j = N
from i := 1 to N
begin
idx = H(i, k1) mod j
S¯[i] = S[idx]
S = S − {S[idx]} and shift left each of
the items after idx in S
j = j − 1
end
S = S¯
i, j, idx, and S¯ are temporary variables in the pro-
gram. Note that the reordering of S serves to evenly
diffuse the positions that embedding is to occur. Oth-
erwise, accumulative effect is possible if we embed
row by row. In addition, this randomization reduces
the likelihood that an attacker can figure out the exact
embedding path, thereby increasing security.
iii) Compute the authentication payload as h =
H(M, k2), where we let M denote the pixels (RGB
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Fig. 5. Flowchart for authentication algorithm.
values) of the atlas, H( · ) is a cryptographic one-
way hash function; e.g., MD5 or SHA1 [5] and k2 is
another secret authentication key. Note that different
keys are used to rule out possible correlation.
iv) In a gradual way, encode the path along the or-
dered points in S into a bitstream B by the encoding
primitive. In the meantime, run an adaptive lossless
arithmetic compression algorithm C( · ) to compress
B as B¯ = C(B). Check the difference between B
and B¯. Once there is enough space to accommodate
the authenticating payload, stop the compression al-
gorithm. In particular, let Sj = {p1, p2, . . . , pj} be
the path of j steps along S and Bj correspond to the
bit-stream by encoding the path of Sj , the following
program achieves the above process:
while (|Bi | − |C(Bi)|) < |h|
i = i + 1
i is a fixed value when the above program halts.
v) Embedh‖C(Bi) into the path ofSi by the embedding
method, where ‖ denotes concatenation.
The basic steps of the authentication algorithm are shown in
Fig. 5.
In particular, the authentication algorithm works as follows:
b) Authentication Algorithm:
i) Scan the watermarked atlas M′ row by row in the
same fixed pattern as in the embedding algorithm,
and generate an ordered set S = {p′1, p′2, . . . p′N } of
channelling points as in the embedding algorithm.
ii) Reorder S with the secret key k1 as in the embedding
algorithm.
iii) In a gradual way, encode the path along S into a bit
stream B, and decompress B to be B¯ by running the
lossless arithmetic decompression algorithm D( · )
that corresponds to C( · ). Stop the algorithm D( · )
once |B¯ −B| ≥ |h|, where |h| is the bit length of
H( · ). Let Sj ,Bj be defined as in the embedding
algorithm, the following program achieves the above
process:
while (|D(Bi)| − |Bi |) < |h|
i = i + 1
i is a fixed value when the program halts.
iv) Sequentially get |h| bits from the position i afterwards
along S as the authentication payload h′. Next, use
the bit-stream B¯i = D(Bi) to reconstruct the original
atlas by the recovering method, and
v) Compare h′ with H(M, k2), where M is the pixels
of the recovered atlas. If h′ = H(M¯, k2), then the
recovered atlas is authentic, otherwise it has been
tampered.
3) Discussion: In this scheme, we try to recover the original
image without first considering whether the watermarked atlas
had ever been tampered with. We can actually make some en-
hancements to this aspect. The basic idea is to insert an extra
piece of authentication data of some areas in an atlas that are not
affected by watermarking. We can determine such areas before
watermarking occurs, because the length of the authentication
data suffices help us decide the channelling points that will be
affected by watermarking (see step iv) of the embedding algo-
rithm). With such an extra piece of authentication data inserted,
in step iv) of the authentication algorithm, we first extract this
authentication data together with h′, then use this authentication
data to determine whether the not-to-be-affected areas has been
tampered with. If no tamper is found, we proceed to recover the
original image, otherwise, we simply reject. This improvement
is of particular importance when data tamper indeed occurred,
since in such cases there is no need and in fact, it is not possible
to reconstruct the original content.
It is clear that the embedding capacity of this scheme is de-
termined by the total number of channelling points as well as
the effectiveness of the lossless arithmetic compression algo-
rithm. Once the total number of channelling points is fixed,
more compression effectiveness of the compression algorithm
means larger embedding capacity.
We now examine security of this scheme. Specifically, with-
out knowing the secret authentication key k1 and k2, an ad-
versary is faced with forging an arbitrary atlas M′′ (with re-
spect to a watermarked M′) in an attempt to pass the au-
thentication. It is equivalent to the case that given a fixed
hash value h, the value of H(M′′, k2) happens to be h. Ev-
idently, the probability for this is 1/2|h | = 2−128 when |h| =
|H( · )| = 128, according to the collision free property of the
cryptographic one-way hash function. As a final note, we point
out the compression algorithm does not affect security of the
watermarking scheme.
C. Our Second Reversible Watermarking Scheme
Our second scheme is applicable to any atlas in palette for-
mat, including those with homochromous structures. We de-
velop this scheme by extending the zero-distortion method pro-
posed in [34] to attain increased computational efficiency while
without compromising its actual security. This second scheme
does embedding by merely manipulating the palette of an at-
las, thereby causing no distortion to the image pixels. The main
difference between our scheme and Fridrich et al. in case 1 is
that our scheme only involves permutation of the entries in the
palette, whereas Fridrich et al. involves adding a new entry in the
palette. Consequently, our scheme can be used for any palette
image, whereas Fridrich et al. can only be applied to images
with palette having fewer than 256 distinct colors.
1) The Scheme: The basic idea of our scheme is to arrange
the palette according to the authentication payload of the atlas,
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Fig. 6. Rearrangement of the first l colors.
such that a correlation between the palette and the image content
is established. In authentication, the image is authentic if the
correlation still holds. In particular, the scheme works as follows.
a) Embedding Algorithm:
i) Suppose there are N colors in the palette of the atlas
M to be watermarked, and each color has the form
(R,G,B). Sort these colors into a virtual list Vlist
according to the values of R.2562 + G.256 + B.
ii) Compute the authentication payload for M as h =
H(M, k), where we let M denote the pixels (RGB
values) of the atlas. Partition h into l segments of
equal length as h = h0h1 . . . hl−1, where each hi sat-
isfies 0 ≤ hi ≤ N . Note that the length of hi should
be determined as |hi | = m for some m that satisfies
2m ≤ N < 2m+1. The intuition for this is that we
want m (i.e., the length of each hi) is as large as
possible while the value of each hi is less than N .
iii) Rearrange the palette of M by the following steps.
1) Move the h0th color in Vlist to the 0th entry in the
palette. 2) Move thehi th (1 ≤ i < l) by the following
program.
j = 1
from i := 1 to l − 1
begin
if hi /∈ {h0, . . . , hi−1}
begin
move the hi th color in Vlist to the jth
position in the palette
j = j + 1
end
end
i, j are temporary variables in the program. 3) Se-
quentially move the rest colors in Vlist to the remain-
ing entries after the first j entries in the palette (j is a
fixed value when step 2) halts).
Note that step 2) is the tricky part of the rearrangement
process. The basic idea is that we simply ignore hi
if hi is equal to any proceding hn , where 0 ≤ n < i.
See the example in Fig. 6, supposing h is partitioned
into 6 segments. Since h0 and h4 refer to the same
color in Vlist (h0 = h4), so h4 is ignored and the
entry that corresponds to h4 in the palette is occupied
by the color referred to by h5 (the h5th color in Vlist).
iv) Change the image data according to the new palette.
For example, when a color in the ith entry in the
original palette is moved to the jth entry in the new
palette, all i in the image data need to be modified to
be j.
b) Authentication Algorithm:
i) Suppose there are N ′ colors in the palette of the wa-
termarked atlas M′. Sort these colors into a virtual
list VList as in the embedding algorithm.
ii) Compute the authentication payload for the atlas as
h′ = H(M′, k), where we letM′ denote the pixels of
the atlas. Partition h′ into l segments of equal length
as h′ = h′0h
′
1 . . . h
′
l−1 as in the embedding algorithm.
iii) Sequentially authenticate h′i , 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, by the
following program. Suppose PCi is the color in the
ith entry in the palette and Ci is the color in Vlist
referred to by h′i :
if PC0 = C0
return INVALID
j = 1
from i := 1 to l − 1
begin
if h′i /∈ {h′0, . . . , h′i−1}
begin
if PCj = Ci
return INVALID




i, j are temporary variables. Note that in this program,
M′ is deemed authentic only when all h′i , i ∈ [0, l)
pass the testing. In this authentication procedure, h′i
will be ignored if it is equal to any preceding h′n ,
where n ∈ [0, i)
2) Discussions: Our extension to the method in [34] (Wu’s
method for short) lies mainly in the following: the l segments of
the authentication payload h in Wu’s method must be distinct to
one another. As a result, Wu’s method may need to repeatedly
feed a distinct random seed to the one-way hash function in
computing the authentication payload until a suitable hash value
is found. An contrast, the l segments of h in our scheme are
not necessarily distinct, so we achieve higher computational
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efficiency. In addition, we do not need to remember the seed
during data authentication.
In the sequel, we assume 2m ≤ N < 2m+1, where N is the
number of colors in the palette of an atlas. Clearly, m ≤ 8. Ap-
plicability of this scheme to electronic clinical atlas is discussed
as follows. As each segment hi is used as a color index in our
scheme, to guarantees that hi ≤ N and hi is as large as pos-
sible, |hi | should be equal to m. As a result, the total number
of segments that the hash value h is partitioned is l = |h|/m.
Moreover, clearly l should be less than or equal to N , that
is, l ≤ N ⇒ |h|/m ≤ N ⇒ |h|/m ≤ 2m . Assume |h| = 128,
then m ≥ 5. This suggests that for an atlas to be watermarkable,
it has to have at least 32 colors in the palette.
Next, we shall examine the actual security of this scheme.
In particular, we aim to determine the upper bound for the
probability of successful forgeries by an adversary without
knowing the secret authentication key k. That is, we want
to answer the following question: given an watermarked at-
las M′, in what probability can an arbitrarily forged M′′
(M′′ = M′) by the adversary pass the authentication pro-
cess? As we just discussed, it should hold that 5 ≤ m ≤ 8
and 2m ≤ N < 2m+1, where N is the number of colors
in the palette of an atlas. Therefore, an 128-bit hash value
would be accordingly partitioned into l segments, where 16 ≤
l ≤ 26.
We start with a simple example by assuming l = 4.
Consequently, h = H(M′, k) would be partitioned into
h = h0h1h2h3, where M′ denote the pixels of a watermarked
atlas M′ and k is the secret authentication key. Without loss
of generality, suppose h0 = h2, so upon watermarking the
first four entries (0th, 1th, 2nd, third) in the palette of M′
would be the colors referred to by h0, h1, h3, h¯3, respectively,
where h¯3 refers to the random color that occupies the third
entry. This can be shown in Fig. 7(a). According to the
authentication algorithm, a forged M′′ would be deemed
authentic as long as h′ = H(M ′′, k) satisfies any of the
four cases shown in Fig. 7(b): 1) each of segment h′1, h′2,
and h′3 of h′ is the same as h0; 2) each of segment h′2 and
h′3 is the same as either h0 or h1; 3) segment h′3 is the
same as either of h0, h1 and h3; 4) h′ = h0h1h3h¯3. In total,
there would be nine possible values for h′ that could pass
the authentication. Specifically, 1) h′ = h0h0h0h0; 2) h′ =
h0h1h0h0, h
′ = h0h1h0h1, h′ = h0h1h1h0, h′ = h0h1h1h1;
3) h′ = h0h1h3h0, h′ = h0h1h3h1, h′ = h0h1h3h3; 4) h′ =
h0h1h3h¯3.
We proceed to generalize the above simple example to
the general case of any value of l. That is, given the first
l entries of the palette that correspond to h = h0h1 . . . hl−1,
we discuss what values h′ can take so as to pass the au-
thentication. Generalizing the cases in Fig. 7(b), we know
that h′ taking value as h′ = h0h1 . . . hi−1h′i . . . h′l−1 for a
particular i could succeed in the authentication, where each
h′j ∈ {h0, h1, . . . , hi−1}. The number of possible values of
h′ in such a case can be computed as il−i . Considering
all cases of i (1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1), we then get the total num-
ber of values that h′ can take as Num =
∑l−1
i=1 i
(l−i) + 1 =




. The probability Pr of an adversary forging an
arbitrary atlas M′′ that could be deemed authentic is thus
Pr = Num
2|h | .
Apparently, Pr increases with Num as |h| fixes. We are
now going to determine the upper bound of Pr in the case
of watermarking the electronic clinical atlas. Clearly when
l = 26 (16 ≤ l ≤ 26),Num takes the biggest value as Num =
∑26
i=1 i
(26−i) < 256. Hence Pr = Num
2|h | < 2
56/2128 = 2−72.
We then have the following claim to answer the question raised
earlier: in the absence of the secret authentication key, the prob-
ability that an arbitrary bogus atlas by an adversary makes the
authentication algorithm return AUTHENTIC cannot exceed
2−72.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented and conducted extensive experiments on our
proposed two schemes. Experiments were done on a PC with 2G
CPU and 512M RAM. Source codes were written in Microsoft
C++. The hash function H( · ) in our schemes was instantiated
by MD5 [5] which offers 128-bit hash values.
A. Experiments With the First Scheme
In the experiments with the first scheme, we used truncated
hash values of 64 bits. From the previous security discussions,
we know this achieves a confidence factor of 2−64, which is
a sufficiently small probability for forgery. For lossless com-
pression, we used the LZW compression algorithm [35], which
works well when the streams to be compressed have repeated
patterns. In addition, in the experiments we authenticate the
set of boundary points of structures contained in an atlas. The
reasons are: 1) in our current applications [22], we utilized the
boundary points rather than the entire content of an atlas itself;
2) the set of boundary points is a compact representation of the
corresponding atlas, and the integrity of the boundary points of
an atlas is equivalent to the integrity of the atlas, since every
change of the atlas pixels will be reflected in the set of boundary
points gathered by the algorithms in [22]; and 3) this is expected
to accelerate the computation of authentication payload, because
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Fig. 8. Atlas (left) and the boundaries of all structures (right).
Fig. 9. Experiment results. (a) The original atlas. (b) Positions where wa-
termarking occurs in the first scheme. (c) The watermarked atlas by the first
scheme. (d) The watermarked atlas by the second scheme.
less data are feed to the hash function, although this acceleration
is theoretically minor. We leverage on the algorithms proposed
in [22] to extract the boundary points of atlases. Fig. 8 shows an
atlas and the set of boundary points within it.
From the experiments, it is estimated that on average, 3000–
4000 channelling points could be found in an atlas, and most of
the atlases are watermarkable by our first scheme. Fig. 9 shows
an example of our experimental results: Fig. 9(a) is the original
atlas, Fig. 9(b) shows the positions where embedding occurs
and Fig. 9(c) shows the corresponding watermarked atlas. It can
be seen from Fig. 9(b) that the revised points had been well
diffused, which is due to the output randomness of the hash
function used in the reordering of the channelling points. Since
embedding occurs upon the boundary points of structures, so no
apparent distinction is seen between Figs. 9(a) and (c).
B. Experiments With the Second Scheme
Experiments with the second scheme focused on the pro-
gram implementation and testing applicability of the scheme.
Other factors such as image quality degradation are not a con-
cern, since the scheme only involves permutation of the palette
and the visual appearance of the atlases is not affected at all.
Fig. 9(d) shows a watermarked atlas by our second scheme that
corresponds to Fig. 9(a). As we have discussed earlier, an atlas
is watermarkable if it has 32 or more colors in the palette. In
fact, all the atlases we experimented have more colors than 32.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed two tailored reversible watermark-
ing schemes for authentication of the electronic clinical atlas.
The first scheme was designed exclusively for atlases with ho-
mochromous structures, and followed Fridrich et al.’s general
methodology for achieving reversibility; the second scheme can
be applied to any atlas in palette format, and incurres zero-
distortion to the watermarked atlas by simply manipulating the
palette. A weakness of the second scheme is that while it attains
the authentication functionality by detecting every tampering to
the image content, it can generate false positives: an adversary
can permute the entries in the palette, and modify the image data
accordingly without changing the image content. In such cases,
the authentication algorithm will report tamperings. This weak-
ness is actually the price that must be paid for zero-distortion.
We implemented the proposed schemes and obtained promising
experimental results.
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